Examining the United States and European Union’s Approaches to the State-Building Process in Afghanistan After 2001

Abstract

‌Afghanistan is a country that has consistently failed in the process of state-building. Although rulers have governed under the name of the state over the past century, the absence of accountable governments has led the country to remain mired in chronic conflict and violence. State-building efforts were renewed in 2001 with the direct and indirect support of the United States and the European Union. The primary question is: what role did the U.S. and the EU play in the state-building process in Afghanistan? While the U.S. and the EU did not fundamentally disagree on the principles and definitions of state-building, they diverged on the methods and approaches to achieving these goals. This research employs an analytical-descriptive methodology and utilizes library resources, articles, and journals for data collection. The findings indicate that the U.S. and the EU were aligned on issues such as supporting democracy, revitalizing and strengthening security forces, reconstruction and development, and legal reforms. Furthermore, differences in implementing these objectives and their perspectives, particularly the political versus military approach, unilateralism, and asymmetrical actions, prevented the U.S. and the EU from establishing a strong government, leaving the state-building project incomplete.